DEATH BED, Scotch¹ law. The incapacity to exercise the power of disposing of one's property after being attacked with a mortal disease.

2. It commences with the beginning of such disease.

3. There are two exceptions to this general rule, namely: 1. If he survive for sixty days after the act or, 2. If he go to kirk or market unattended. He is then said to be in legitima potestate, or in liege poustie. 1 Bell's Com. 84, 85.

DEATH BED OR DYING DECLARATIONS. In cases of homicide, those which are made in extremis, when the person making them is conscious of his danger and has given up all hopes of recovery, charging some other person or persons with the murder. See 1 Phil. Ev. 200; Stark². Ev. part 4, p 458; 15 Johns. R. 288; 1 Hawk's R. 442; 2 Hawk's R. 31; McNally's Ev. 174; Swift's Ev. 124.

2. These declarations, contrary to the general rule that, hearsay³ is not evidence, are constantly received. The principle of this exception is founded partly on the situation of the dying person, which is considered to be as powerful over his conscienceas the obligation of an oath, and partly on the supposed absence of interest on the verge⁴ of the next world, which dispenses⁵ with a necessity of a cross-examination. But before such declarations can be ad-mitted in evidence against a prisoner, it must be satisfactorily proved, that the deceased at the time of making them was conscious of his danger and had given up all hopes of recovery. 1 Phil. Ev. 215, 216; Stark. Ev. part 4, p. 460.

3. They are admissible, as such, only in cases of homicide, where the death of the deceased is the subject of the charge, and the circumstances of the death are the subject of the dying declarations. 2 B. & C. 605; 15 John. 286: 4 C. & P. 233.Vide. 2 M. & Rob. 53.

4. The declarant must not have been incapable⁶ of a religious sense of accountability to his Maker⁷; for, if it appears that such religious sense was wanting, whether it arose from infidelity, imbecility or tender age, the declarations are alike inadmissible. 1 Greenl. Ev. §157; 1 Phil. Ev. 289; Phil. & Ani. Ev. 296; 2 Russ. on Cr. 688. See, in general, Bac. Abr. Evidence, K; Addis. R. 832 East's P. C. 354, 356; 1 Stark. C. 522 2 Hayw. R. 31; 1 Hawk's R. 442; Swift's Ev. 124; Pothier, by Evans, vol. 2, p. 293; Anth. N. P. 176, and note a; Str. 500.

DEATH'S PART, English law. That portion of the personal estate of a deceased man which remained after his wife and children had received their reasonable parts from his estate; which was, if he had both a wife and child or children, one-third part; if a wife and no child, or a child or children and no wife, one-half; if neither wife nor child, he had the whole to dispose of by his last will and testament⁸; and if he made no will, the same was to go to his administrator⁹. And within the city of London, and throughout the province of York, in case of intestacy, the wife and children were till lately entitled to their reasonable parts, and the residue¹⁰ only was distributable by, the statute¹¹ of distribution; but by the 11 G. I. c. 18, s. 17, 18, the power of devising was thrown generally open. Burn's L. Dict., See this dict. tit. Legitime, and Lex Falcidia.