DOUBLE INSURANCE, contracts. Where the insured makes, two insurances on the same risk, and the same interest. 12 Mass. 214. It differs from re-insurance in this, that it is made by the insured, with a view of receiving a double satisfaction in case of loss; whereas a re-insurance is made by a former insurer, his executors or assigns, to protect himself and his estate from a risk to which they were liable by the first insurance. The two policies are considered as making but one insurance. They are good to the extent of the value of the effects put in risk; but the insured shall not be permitted to recover a double satisfaction. He can sue the underwriters on both the policies, but he can only recover the real amount of his loss, to which all the underwriters on both shall contribute in proportion to their several subscriptions². Marsh³. Ins. B. 1, c. 4, s. 4; 5 S. & R. 473; 4 Dall. 348; 1 Yeates, 161; 9 S. & R. 103; 1 Wash . C. C. Rep. 419; 2 Wash. C. C. Rep. 186; 2 Mason, 476.

DOUBLE PLEA. The alleging⁴, for one single purpose, two or more distinct grounds of defence, when one of them would be as effectual in law, as both or all. Vide Duplicity.

DOUBLE VOUCHER⁵. A common recovery is sometimes suffered with double voucher, which occurs when the person first vouched⁶ to warranty⁷, comes in and vouches⁸ over a third person. See a precedent⁹, 2 Bl. Com. Appx. No. V. p. xvii.; also, Voucher.

2. The neecessity for double voucher arises when the tenant¹⁰ in tail is not the tenant in the writ¹, but is tenant by warranty; that is, where he is vouched, and comes in and confesses the warranty. Generally speaking, to accomplish this result, a previous conveyance¹¹ is necessary, by the tenant in tail, to a third person, in order to make such third person tenant to a writ of entry. Preston on Convey. 125-6.

DOUBLE WASTE. When a tenant, bound to repair, suffers a house to be wasted, and then unlawfully fells timber to repair it, he is said to commit double waste. Co. Litt. 53. See Waste.

DOUBT. The uncertainty¹² which exists in relation to a fact, a proposition, or other thing; or it is an equipoise of the mind arising from an equality of contrary reasons. Ayl. Pand. 121.

2. The embarrassing position of a judge is that of being in doubt, and it is frequently the lot of the wisest and most enlightened to be in this condition, those who have little or no experience usually find no difficulty in deciding the most, problematical questions.

3. Some rules, not always infallible, have been adopted in doubtful cases, in order to arrive at the truth. 1. In civil cases, the doubt ought to operate against him, who having it in his power to prove facts to remove the doubt, has neglected to do so. In cases of fraud when there is a doubt, the presumption¹³ of innocence¹⁴ (q. v.) ought to remove it. 2. In criminal cases, whenever a reasonable doubt exists as to the guilt¹⁵ of the accused that doubt ought to operate in his favor. In such cases, particularly, when the liberty, honor or life of an individual is at stake, the evidence to convict ought to be clear, and devoid¹⁶ of all reasonable doubt. See Best on Pres. §195; Wils. on Cir¹⁷. Ev. 26; Theory of Presumptive Proof, 64; 33 How. St. Tr. 506; Burnett, Cr. Law of Scotl. 522; 1 Greenl. Ev. §1 D'Aguesseau, Oeuvres, vol. xiii. p. 242; Domat, liv. 3, tit. 6.

4. No judge is presumed to have any doubt on a question of law, and he cannot therefore refuse to give a judgment¹⁸ on that account. 9 M. R. 355; Merlin, Repert. h. t.; Ayliffe's Pand. b. 2, t. 17; Dig. lib. 34, t. 5; Code, lib. 6, t. 38. Indeed, in some countries; in China, for example, ignorance of the law in a judge is punishable with blows. Penal¹⁹ Laws of China, B. 2, s. 61.