中国石油职称英语考试通用教材电子版（2007年）四十九

49. Playing the Oil Card（打石油牌）
　　1. Washington and Tehran don't agree on much these days. But in their conflict over Iran's nuclear program, both seem willing to use oil as a political weapon.
　　1、华盛顿与德黑兰如今在许多方面自说自话，但在它们之间有关伊朗核计划的冲突中，双方似乎都愿意把石油当政治武器使用。
　　2. The U.S. believes that sanctions on Iran's energy exports might force Tehran to renounce¹ its uranium-enrichment ambitions. Iran hopes its threats to withhold² some or all of those exports will persuade the international community to back off.
　　2、美国认为，对伊朗的能源出口进行制裁或可迫使德黑兰放弃其铀浓缩的野心；伊朗则希望以威胁停止部分或全部石油出口来迫使国际社会作出让步。
　　3. If the two sides can't agree on who would be punishing whom by playing the oil card, the likelihood of diplomatic resolution may be even more remote than is commonly accepted.
　　3、如果双方不能在打石油牌到底是谁惩罚谁方面达成一致，外交解决的可能性会比一般所认可的更加渺茫。
　　4. One thing is certain: a substantial reduction in Iran's energy output would have a significant impact on global oil prices. Iran is the fourth-largest oil exporter in the world, behind only Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Norway. It sells more than 2.5 Million barrels a day and is believed to have about 10 percent of the world's proven reserves. Many analysts³ say a supply cut could combine with other market pressures to quickly drive prices up to $80 to $100 a barrel.
　　4、有一件事是确定无疑的：伊朗能源输出大量减少将对全球油价产：生重大的影响。伊朗是世界上仅次于沙特阿拉伯、俄罗斯和挪威的第四大石油出口国。它每天出售250多万桶石油，据信约拥有世界已探明石油储量的10％。许多分析人士认为，石油供给的减少可能与其它市场压力因素一起迅速驱动油价升至每桶80至100美元。
　　5. Is either side bluffing⁴? Iran's threat to pull oil off the market is not an empty one, Iran's leaders—who want to visibly assert their defiance⁵ of the West, need domestic support for the regime, and divide international opinion—have only the country's energy exports with which to influence the outcome of the diplomatic conflict.
　　5、双方都在虚张声势地吓唬人?伊朗威胁断绝石油的市场供应并非虚言恫吓，伊朗领导人—他们要鲜明地坚持他们对西方的蔑视，需要闽内对政府的支持并分化国际舆论—只有国家的能源出口可资利用，去影响外交冲突的结果。
　　6. Of course, were Iran to completely cut off its oil supply, it would badly damage its own economy. In addition, a total shutdown would harm many of Iran's friends, though it would also increase oil income for those who are net exporters of oil (such as Russia and other OPEC members).
　　6、当然，如果伊朗完全切断其石油供应，将严重地破坏其自身经济。此外，完全停止石油出口会伤害许多伊朗的朋友，尽管这样做也会增加那些石油净出口国的收入(譬如俄罗斯和其他欧佩克成员国)。
　　7. But there are a number of incremental⁶ steps Iran can take that would rattle⁷ those who depend on affordable⁸ energy without sinking its own economy. If Iran cut 200,000 to 300,3000 barrels a day, oil markets would react not only to the fall in supply but also to fears of what Tehran might do next.
　　7、但伊朗可以采取许多渐进的步骤，让那些依赖价格可承受能源的国家惶惶不安，而保持自己的经济不至直线下滑。如果伊朗每天削减20万至30万桶石油出口，石油市场不仅会对供给下降有反应，而且还会对因担心德黑兰下一步可能做什么有反应。
　　8. The U.S. isn't bluffing either. Although Iran is a net exporter of oil, it is a net importer of refined products. Washington calculates that if it could cut off the supply of those products, including gasoline, Iran would be unable to build new refineries⁹ quickly enough to keep pace with growth in the country's demand, estimated at more than 5 percent a year. And a boycott¹⁰ of Iranian exports, it figures, would hurt Iran more than it would hurt the U.S.
　　8．美国亦非虚声恫吓。尽管伊朗是个石油净出口国，但它也是精炼石油产品的净进口国。华盛顿推测，如果它切断包括汽油在内的那些精炼石油产品的供应，伊朗没有能力足够迅速地建造新的炼厂，以满足预计每年高于5％的国内需求增长。抵制伊朗石油出口对伊朗的伤害比对美国的伤害更大。
　　9. Iran is unlikely to use its oil weapon first. But if the U.S. were to impose punitive¹¹ measures—either through the United Nations Security Council or with a smaller coalition¹² of nations——Iran would probably retaliate¹³. And if a limited supply cut failed to ease international pressure, Iran could up the ante by cutting off supplies to a U.S ally. One possible target: resource-poor Japan, which imports 16 percent of its crude from Iran.
　　9．伊朗不大可能率先使用其石油武器。但如果美国强行施加惩罚性措施一一无论是通过联合国安理会还是通过规模小一些的国家联盟—伊朗很可能进行报复。进而，如果有限的石油供应减少不能缓解国际压力，伊朗可能提叶赌注，切断对美国的某个盟友的石油供应。一个可能的目标是资源匮乏的日本。日本16％的原油从伊朗进口。
　　10. Then there is Iran's trump¹⁴ card. If Tehran believes that a U.S. or Israeli air strike against one of its nuclear facilities is likely, it might well stage military maneuvers¹⁵ in the Persian Gulf¹⁶ to remind the world that it can obstruct¹⁷ the flow of 20 percent of the planet's oil supply at the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz. Such a threat was recently made by Interior Minister Mostafa Pourmohammade and, it followed through, could interrupt the global supply chain and trigger a sharp and immediate¹⁸ spike¹⁹ in oil prices.
　　10．另外，伊朗手中握有王牌。如果德黑兰认为，美国或以色列可能空袭其某一核设施，伊朗很可能在波斯湾举行军事演习，让世界明白它能在极具战略意义的霍尔木兹海峡阻断全球20％的石油供应。内政部长穆斯塔法·保尔·穆罕默德最近就发出了这样的威胁。如果真这么做，可能打断全球石油供应链，并引发油价骤然剧烈地上涨。
　　11. Some analysts argue that it is less dangerous for Washington to simply accept a nuclear Iran than to risk the damage that sharp Iranian production cuts—or Iranian retaliation²⁰ against a U.S. or Israeli military strike—might do to U.S. interests.
　　11．一些分析家认为，对华盛顿来说，较之冒伊朗石油急剧减产、伊朗对美国或以色列的军事打击进行报复的危险对美国利益可能造成的破坏，索性接·乏一个核伊朗危险要小一些。
　　12. But the Bush administration fears that Iran might use its nuclear program to assert political dominance in the region and sell nuclear material and expertise²¹ to other states, and possibly to terrorist groups.
　　12．但布什政府担心，伊朗可能利用其核项目在该地区确保政治上的主导地位，向其他国家出售核材料及技术，而且可能出售给恐怖主义组织。
　　13. The U.S. will continue over the next several months to try to push sanctions through the Security Council. But the council is increasingly unlikely to impose them.
　　13．在未来的几个月里，美国将继续试图使安理会通过制裁决议。但安理会越来越不大可能实施制裁。
　　14. If the Bush administration decides it cannot use the UN process to compel Iran to back down, it will probably look for other levers of political and economic coercion²², including attempts to recruit a "coalition of the willing" that is prepared to temporarily cut energy and other commercial ties with Tehran. The success of such a coalition strategy would depend on the number of countries willing to join.
　　14．如果布什政府判定，它不能利用联合国程序迫使伊朗放弃铀浓缩计划它可能会寻求其他政治和经济的高压手段，包括努力招募一个“自愿联盟”，准备暂时中断与德黑兰的能源及其他商业关系。这样一种联盟战略的成功与否取决于自愿加入国家的数量。
　　15. Iran and the U.S. have agreed to face-to-face talks on the situation in Iraq. Although Iran says its nuclear program will not be on the agenda, the U.S. is sure to broach²³ the subject and to search for any slack in Tehran's bargaining position.
　　15．伊朗和美国已经同意就伊拉克境内局势进行面对面的对话。尽管伊朗称《核计划将不列入对话议程，但美国必定要提出这个话题，并从德黑兰讨价还价立场中寻找任何有懈可击的环节。
　　16. It is unlikely to find any. Iran's willingness to talk has more to do with efforts to convince a domestic audience that it has become the go-to power on regional issues and to show that U.S. attempts to stabilize²⁴ Iraq aren't going well.
　　16．美国不大可能找到任何有懈可击的环节。伊朗愿意对话，更多地是因为它想极力让国内民众相信，在地区问题上它已变成可以依靠的强国，并想让世人明白美国稳定伊拉克局势的努力进展不畅。
　　17. When the nuclear subject is raised, the two sides are likely to reiterate²⁵ their mutually exclusive positions, raising the danger that the meeting could end up hardening mutual²⁶ mistrust. Though they agree that oil makes for an effective weapon, Tehran and Washington don't see eye to eye on anything else. And that's bad news for those who hope to head off substantial upward pressure on oil prices.
　　17、当核话题提出后，双方很可能重申他们相互排斥的立场，从而引发这样的危险：会谈可能以加深相互猜疑而告终。尽管他们一致认为，石油可以充当有效的武器，但在其他任何议题上，德黑兰与华盛顿的看法均不一致。这对那些希望摆脱油价大幅上涨压力的国家来说，委实是坏消息。