在竞争残酷的美国商界，首席执行官们很少被人视为可以诉苦的对象，或者是职业发展方面可信赖的顾问。

In America's dog-eat-dog business world, chief executives are rarely seen as friendly shoulders to cry on or trusted advisers¹ on career development.

然而，代表投资者对公司进行批判性分析的华尔街分析师，却把其研究对象公司的首席执行官视为这样的人。

But that is exactly how Wall Street analysts³ - whose job is to cast a critical eye on companies on behalf of investors⁴ - appeared to have regarded the executives of companies they covered.

日前公布的一份学术研究报告显示，数百名股票分析师曾向企业首席执行官们寻求帮助，涉及内容包罗万象，从如何与该银行的客户见面，到他们的个人问题。

According to an academic study to be released today, hundreds of equity⁵ analysts asked executives for favours ranging from meetings with their banks' clients to advice on personal matters.

多数首席执行官会答应这些请求，但这种慷慨的价码很高：如果公司业绩逊色，或进行了一宗风险较高的并购交易，接受帮忙的分析师将不太可能调降该公司的评级。

Most executives obliged but their generosity⁶ came at a price: analysts on the receiving end of executives' favours were less likely to downgrade a company as a result of poor earnings⁷ or a risky⁸ acquisition.

相应的，如果知道另一位分析师因为发布了对该公司不利的研究报告，因而在寻求帮助时遭到该公司拒绝，那么，其他分析师们采取类似行为的可能性也大大降低。

Similarly, knowing that another analyst² had been denied favours as a result of negative coverage⁹ made analysts much less likely to take similar action.

这一史无前例的研究显示，近年来一直萦绕在华尔街和美国企业界关系上的利益冲突问题依然存在，且相当严重。该研究报告的作者为密歇根大学(University of Michigan)的詹姆斯o韦斯特法尔(James Westphal)和得克萨斯大学(University of Texas)的迈克尔o克莱门特(Michael Clement¹⁰)。

The unprecedented¹¹ research - by James Westphal of the University of Michigan and Michael Clement of the University of Texas - suggests that the conflicts of interests that have plagued the interaction between Wall Street and corporate¹² America in recent years are alive and well.

韦斯特法尔表示："这是首席执行官和分析师之间关系的副作用，这种关系可能会削弱分析师建议的客观性。"如果分析师确实受到了首席执行官帮忙的影响，那么投资者，尤其是散户投资者，怎么能信赖分析师的研究报告呢？

"This is a side-effect of the relationship between executives and analysts that can perhaps compromise the objectivity of their recommendations," says Mr Westphal. But if analysts are indeed swayed by chief executives' largesse¹³, how could investors, especially retail¹⁴ investors, trust their calls?

华尔街分析师的独立性曾多次遭到质疑。然而，直到现在，监管机构的重点一直放在将投行内部的业务员和荐股分析师脱离关系上。自从安然(Enron)丑闻爆发后，美国已经进行了相关改革，两者的关系已不那么密切了。

The independence of Wall Street analysts has been repeatedly questioned. Until now, however, the regulatory spotlight¹⁵ had focused on unwinding the relationship between dealmakers and stockpickers within investment banks, which has become much less cosy¹⁶ since post-Enron reforms.

至于分析师和企业首席执行官之间的关系，多数观察人士认为，主要问题在2000年就已解决了。当时，美国监管者将企业向某些分析师透露股价敏感信息列为非法行为。

As for the links between analysts and executives, most observers believed the main problem had been resolved in 2000, when US regulators outlawed¹⁷ the disclosure of price-sensitive information to selected analysts.

然而，这一最新研究却采取了与众不同的方式。调查于2001年至2003年进行，针对1800多名分析师进行了问卷调查，他们的回答得到了数百名首席执行官的验证。

But the new study - carried out between 2001 and 2003 on more than 1,800 analysts whose responses were cross-checked with those of hundreds of executives - takes a different approach.

调查的出发点是两个心理学公理：第一，个人会对那些向他们提供帮助的人心存感激。第二，如果人认为自己能从帮助中得到某些东西，他们更有可能向他人提供帮助。

Its starting point is two psychological axioms: that individuals feel grateful to those doing them a favour; and that human beings are more likely to bestow¹⁸ a favour on someone when they think there is something in it for them.

然而，调查结果甚至令报告的作者感到意外。他们表示，他们就争议性较小的事情提出长长的问题，再把这个问题隐藏在其中，这样，分析师就会承认曾接受过帮助。

The findings, however, surprised even the authors of the report, who say they were able to get analysts to admit to receiving favours by burying the questions within a long questionnaire on less controversial, issues.

研究者发现，公司未能实现业绩预期的次数越多，首席执行官们向分析师提供帮忙的可能性也就越大，尤其是对于那些顶级的分析师。

The researchers found that the more a company missed its earnings forecast, the more chief executives were likely to offer favours to analysts, particularly the highly rated ones.

可能更为令人意外的是，这一策略似乎很有用。

Perhaps more surprisingly, the tactic¹⁹ appeared to work.

如果一家公司在其核心市场之外进行高风险并购，"接受帮忙"的分析师对该公司降级的可能性减少了65%。

In the case of a risky acquisition that moved the company away from its core markets, the likelihood of a downgrade by a "favoured" analyst was cut by 65 per cent.

华尔街观察人士表示，接受研究对象的帮忙，违反了行业组织CFA协会(CFA Institute)的行为准则。

Wall Street observers said that accepting favours from companies under coverage is a breach²⁰ of the code of conduct of the CFA Institute, the trade body.

然而，前电信业高级分析师、《一位华尔街分析师的自白》(Confessions²¹ of a Wall Street Analyst)作者丹o莱因戈尔德(Dan Reingold)表示，尽管这些调查结果令人意外，但它提醒人们，研究分析中存在利益冲突。

But Dan Reingold, a former top telecoms analyst and author of Confessions of a Wall Street Analyst, said that, although the findings were surprising, they served as a reminder²² that there remained conflicts of interest in research.

他表示，主要的利益冲突包括接近公司管理层以及获得公司信息，但他补充称，这对于机构投资者的重要性要小于散户投资者。

He said the key conflicts involved access to company management and information flow, but added that they were less important for institutional investors than for retail investors.

"机构投资者通常都知道某一位分析师是否与某家公司的管理层关系非常密切，因此，它们会有意无意地质疑分析师的推荐。它们会挤掉分析师建议中的水分。但阅读这份研究报告的散户投资者对里面的这些关系毫不知情。"

"Institutional investors will often know if a particular analyst is very close to certain managements and therefore might either consciously or unconsciously tilt²³ their recommendations. They can discount the recommendations. The retail client who reads the research has no idea about any of these relationships."

德意志银行(Deutsche Bank)银行业分析师迈克o梅奥(Mike Mayo)很早之前就表示，分析师面临的来自研究对象的压力，与来自投资银行同事的压力一样大。

Mike Mayo, banking²⁴ analyst at Deutsche Bank, has long argued that the pressure analysts come under from the companies they cover is as significant as the pressure from their investment banking colleagues.

2002年安然丑闻爆发后，梅奥在向美国参议院银行委员会(Senate banking committee)作证表示，公司及其管理层是最好的信息来源，"看好这个公司并存在利益冲突的分析师"可能最了解这些信息。

In testimony²⁵ to the Senate banking committee following the Enron scandal in 2002, Mr Mayo said that companies and their managements were the best source of information and "bullish and conflicted analysts" may have the best access to this information.