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13. It can be inferred that the author of the passage regards Hart s theory of hard cases and the theory of standard law as (A) exhaustive (B) worthy1 of respect (C) interesting but impractical (D) plausible2 but unwieldy (E) hopelessly outmoded 14. Which one of the following is true of the term "legally determinate" (line 6) as it is used in the passage? (A) It represents the idea that every crime should have a fixed3 penalty rather than a range of penalties within which a judge can make an arbitrary choice (B) It refers to a legal case that can be definitively4 resolved in favor of one side or the other according to the law in effect at the time (C) It describes a legal rule that requires judges to limit their actions to applying written law when deciding cases over which people with legal training disagree (D) It refers to any legal case that involves terms with imprecise meanings and thus relies for its resolution only on the determination of judges. (E) It refers to procedures for determining the legal outcome of complex issues in difficult cases. 15. In the passage, the author is primarily concerned with (A) outlining the problems that might be faced by a legislature attempting to create a complete body of law that would prevent judges from making rather than applying the law (B) justifying5 the idea that "hard" cases will always exist in the practice of law, no matter what laws are written or how they are applied (C) presenting evidence to support Dworkin s idea that legal rules apply in an all-or-nothing fashion whereas legal principles apply in more sophisticated ways (D) critiquing the concept of the open texture6 of legal terms as a conceptual flaw in Hart s otherwise well-regarded book. (E) demonstrating that Dworkin s concept of legal principles does not form the basis for a successful attack on Hart s theory of legally indeterminate cases One way governments can decrease air pollution is to impose a tax on industrial carbon dixide emissions8. But why should governments consider a carbon tax when they could control emissions by (5) establishing energy efficiency and conservation standards, by legislating9 against coal use or by increasing inverstment in nuclear? The great virtue10 of such a tax is that it would provide incentives12 for industry to achieve emission7 (10) reductions. Because oil emits more carbon dioxide per unit of energy generated than does natural gas, and coal more than oil,a carbon tax would vary with the type of fuel.Such a tax would induce industry to substitute less- polluting fuels for those carrying a (15) higher tax and also to reduce the total use of energy However it is not clear how high such a tax should be or what its economic and environmental implications would be. At first glance, it is not (20) difficult to estimate roughly the size of the tax needed to effect a given level of emission reduction. One writer estimates for example that a tax of 41 percent on the price of coal 33 percent on oil and 25 percent on gas would reduce the United (25) Kingdom s emissions by 20 percent (using 1988 as the base year) by the year 2005 the target recommended by the 1988 Toronto Conference. It should be noted13 however that these numbers ignore the effect of the tax on economic growth, and (30) hence on emissions, and assume that past responses to a price rise will be replicated14 in the future These numbers are also based on the assumption that all countries will behave cooperatively in imposing15 a carbon tax. (35) There are very strong reasons to believe that cooperation would be difficult to win. If most countries cooperated. then any country that chose not to cooperate would be advantaged it would have no abatement16 costs, and the effect on the (40) environment of its defection would be relatively17 small. Because of this "free rider" effect cooperation on a scale needed to reduce carbon dioxide emissions might prove elusive18 Should countries act unilaterally to durb (45) emissions? If a country were to act unilaterally the benefits would be spread across the globe, whereas the costs would fall solely19 on the country taking the action. The action would reduce emissions globally and the effect of this would be to reduce the benefit (50) other countries would receive if they reduced emissions. As a consequence other countries would have less incentive11 to reduce emissions and would probably emit more carbon dioxide than they would have if the unilateral action had not been taken (55) The entire effect of the emission reduction may not be lost, but it would surely be dimminished by this free-riding behavior 16. According to the passage, the size of the carbon tax levied20 on a given fuel would vary with the (A) amount of that fuel used by a particular industry (B) amount of pollution caused by the fuel being taxed (C) size of the industries using the fuel being taxed (D) effect that the tax would have on a country s economy (E) number of usuers of a particular fuel at a particular time 17. The author mentions the estimates of "One writer" (line 22) primarily in order to (A) indicate in a general way the size that a carbon tax must be for it to be effective. (B) provide the most accurate information available about the most practical size for a carbon tax (C) suggest that the target recommended by the 1988 Toronto Conference is an unrealistic one (D) undermine the argument that a carbon tax would provide incentives for user s to achieve emissions reductions (E) show how the size of an effective carbon tax can be calculated 点击收听单词发音
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